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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses problems of text and interpretation in the 
rhetorical treatise traditionally attributed to Apsines: (i) two declamation themes 
mentioned in 1.33 are clarified; (ii) in 1.44 emendation of poie‹ to pa…ei is 
proposed; (iii) points of rhetorical theory in 4.15 and 5.10 are explained, leading 
to a defence of the transmitted text; (iv) an explanation is offered of the concepts 
of leading and necessary arguments in 10.3, and the implications of this 
passage for the composition of the treatise are briefly discussed; (v) at 10.14 
deletion of sugkr…sewj may be the best solution to the textual problem. 
The recent publication of two bilingual editions
1
 of the rhetorical treatise 
dubiously
2
 attributed to Apsines provides a welcome stimulus to renewed 
reflection on the many problems of text and interpretation that it contains: ‡swj d' 
¥n ti kaˆ aÙtÕj suneisenegke‹n æj e„j koinÕn œranon dunhqe…hn. 
1.33.3f. (224.3f.): oƒ ·»torej prÕ tîn ™kklhsiîn bouleuÒmenoi kr…nontai.  
Speakers who give advice before the assembly are brought to trial 
(Kennedy); les orateurs donnent leur avis avant les assemblées et ils sont mis en 
accusation (Patillon). But what objection could anyone have to their giving 
advice? The speakers surely attract hostility not by giving advice but by taking 
counsel with each other prior to the assembly. The objection is to politicians 
colluding to rig the outcome of debates.  
1.33.4f. (224.4f.): p£nta ·»tora nikînta gr£fei tij ™laÚnein.  
Someone introduces a motion to exile every successful speaker (Kennedy); 
quelquun propose dexiler tout orateur à succès (Patillon). The proposal 
envisaged in these translations would be most ill-advised, since if carried it would 
expose the proposer himself (now ex hypothesi a successful speaker) to the 
penalty of exile. Related declamation themes show that it is not success as such 
that provokes legal restraints, but invariable success (Syrianus 2.150.19-22: ·»twr 
™pˆ tù p£nta nik©n ™fugadeÚqh...; RG 8.408.1-3: ·»tori p£nta nikînti 
™yhf…sato ¹ pÒlij siwp©n...; RG 8.411.1-3: ·»twr ™pˆ tù p£nta nik©n 
                                                 
1
 Mervin R. Dilts and George A. Kennedy (ed.), Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman 
Empire: introduction, text, and translation of the Arts of Rhetoric attributed to Anonymous 
Seguerianus and to Apsines of Gadara (Leiden: Brill, 1997), reviewed D.M. Schenkeveld, 
Mnemosyne 53 (2000), 236-40. Michel Patillon (ed.) Apsinès, Art rhétorique. Problèmes à faux-
semblant (Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2001); see my review, CR 52 (2002), 11-13. I give references 
by the chapter and section numbers introduced by Dilts and Kennedy, and adopted by Patillon, 
together with the line number in Patillon, adding the page and line numbers from Spengel-
Hammer in brackets. The research for this paper was completed with the support of a British 
Academy Research Readership. 
2
 Both recent editions accept the attribution, and are thus forced to make a number of excisions 
from the text which I think cannot be justified on text-critical grounds: hence, in part, my rejection 
of the traditional attribution. See M. Heath, Apsines and Pseudo-Apsines, AJP 119 (1998), 89-
111 (where I also, less confidently, make suggestions about the authorship of this work and 
pseudo-Hermogenes On Invention).  
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™keleÚsqh siwp©n di¦ yhf…smatoj...). The word-order in the present instance is 
admittedly misleading, but rhetorical technography is often remarkably careless of 
the readers convenience. If any change is necessary a transposition (·»tora 
p£nta nikînta) would perhaps suffice. 
1.44.10-12 (227.7f.): sunecîj ploÚsioj pšnhtoj ¢ndri£nta poie‹, kaˆ 
kr…netai Øp' aÙtoà Ûbrewj.  
This, the reading of A, is obviously silly;
3
 Bs pšnhta ™panate…netai is 
simply an attempt to solve the problem by substituting the more commonly 
attested variant in which the rich man makes threatening gestures towards the 
poor man without actually striking him.
4
 As Patillon notes (129 n.60), the statue is 
secured by the principle of lectio difficilior and by the parallel in Quintilian 
(4.2.100): qualis est ille diues qui statuam pauperis inimici flagellis cecidit et reus 
est iniuriarum. But Patillons <Øbr…zesqai> poie‹ is vague and has a makeshift 
air. I propose pa…ei: the rich man strikes the poor mans statue, just as he whips it 
in Quintilian. Syrianus uses the same verb in articulating the rich mans defence in 
the more common variant (œxestin Ópwj ¥n tij boÚloito kine‹n të ce‹re, 
pa…ein dā propetîj e‡rgousin oƒ nÒmoi, 2.115.10-13). In that variant a question 
of definition arises from the fact that the rich man did not actually strike the poor 
man; in our text it arises from the fact that he did not strike the poor man in 
person.  
4.15.13-19 (267.16-268.1): toàto e„sÁktai mān æj m…a ¢nt…qesij, tÕ d' æj 
¢lhqîj e„sˆ dÚo, m…a mān ¢pÕ tÁj boul»sewj, Óti oÙk e„kÕj Ãn 
prosapolšsai me ˜lšsqai t¾n guna‹ka kaˆ Ñne…dei peribale‹n, e„ m¾ ta‹j 
¢lhqe…aij memo…ceuto, ˜tšra dā ¢pÕ tÁj metal»yewj, Óti [Bake: e„ A, om. 
B] kaˆ ¥lloi trÒpoi Ãsan ¢nairšsewj, e„ ™boulÒmhn ¢nele‹n tÕn 
¥nqrwpon.  
The declamation theme in question is one also attested in Hermogenes, who 
uses it to illustrate incident conjecture (™mp…ptwn stocasmÒj): A man convicted 
of treason is to be held under arrest by the general until he reveals his 
accomplices; a general convicted of treason is held in the house of a fellow-
general, who kills him, alleging that he had found him with his wife; the second 
general is charged with complicity.
5
 The primary question in this case is whether 
the second general was complicit in the plot, but the innocent explanation which 
the defendant offers for the suspicious silencing of the first general gives rise to a 
secondary question: did the first general commit adultery with the wife of the 
                                                 
3
 Kennedys suggestion ad loc. (probably a caricature, publicly ridiculing the poor man) is the 
best that can be done to make sense of As text as it stands; but the crucial point would surely need 
to have been made explicit in the theme. 
4
 Syrianus 2.50.16-23, 98.8-10, 100.1f., 8-10, 102.26f., 104.24-105.9, 107.4-6, 112.12-27, 115.10-
13; Sopater RG 4.404.21f., 479.17-19, 482.7-10, 499.26f.; Sopater Division of Questions 91.26-7, 
cf. 83.7-8. 
5
 Hermogenes On Issues 56.26-57.4; translation and commentary in M. Heath, Hermogenes On 
Issues: strategies of argument in later Greek rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
 2
MALCOLM HEATH, NOTES ON PSEUDO-APSINES 
second? Our author cites a declamation
6
 on this theme which introduces a 
counterposition (¢nt…qesij: an argument attributed to the other side so that the 
speaker can provide a solution, or lÚsij) that he claims is in fact two distinct 
counterpositions presented as one. 
The first of the two counterpositions is unproblematically described as based 
on motive (¢pÕ tÁj boul»sewj): the speaker would not have wished to bring a 
false charge of adultery against his wife. The description of the second as being 
based on objection (¢pÕ tÁj metal»yewj) presents a difficulty, as Patillon notes 
(144 n.280). In conjecture the defendant asserts that his action (not, of course, the 
criminal act which he denies committing, but the allegedly incriminating act 
which the prosecution puts forward as a sign of his guilt) is allowable; this is the 
head of argument known as counterplea (¢nt…lhyij), to which the prosecution 
responds with an objection (met£lhyij) conceding that the action is allowable per 
se but finding fault with it on circumstantial groundsfor example, that it is not 
permissible for this person, or on this occasion.
7
 That is clearly not relevant here. 
Patillon conjectures ¢pÕ tÁj dun£mewj, a counterposition based on capacity 
making an apparently natural complement to one based on motive, since motive 
and capacity are standard, linked heads of argument in conjecture.
8
 But this 
cannot be right, since one would expect an argument for the defence based on 
capacity to take the form I could not have.... It is not much of a defence to point 
out that one could have done it in other ways as wellunless the other ways 
would have been preferable, which seems to takes us back to arguing from 
motive.  
A closer examination of objection may resolve the difficulty. As a regular 
heading in the division of conjecture (and some other issues) objection is an 
instance of a general pattern of argument in which an action is faulted in respect 
of some circumstance. But the term can also be used in an extended sense. 
Consider, for example, the scholia on Demosthenes 22.33. In this passage, while 
arguing that Androtion could not legally bring a proposal to the assembly because 
he was an undischarged public debtor, Demosthenes anticipates the response that, 
if so, Androtions opponents should have used the legal procedure known as 
endeixis. Demosthenes replies that, while an endeixis will indeed be forthcoming, 
currently it is more appropriate to expose the illegality of Androtions proposal 
through a graphe paranomon. In the scholia (97bc, 98) Androtions anticipated 
response is identified as a counterposition based on objection (¢nt…qesij 
metalhptik»), since it finds fault with the manner of the proceedings; 
Demosthenes reply in turn is a solution based on objection (lÚsij metalhptik»), 
since it finds fault with Androtions counterposition on the grounds that endeixis is 
not the appropriate manner in which to proceed at the present time. The term 
objection is being used here of any argument that faults an action or argument on 
the other side with regard to one or more elements of circumstance. That extended 
                                                 
6
 Depending on ones view of the text at 4.15.3 (267.6) this declamation is attributed either to 
Apsines or to us, which in turn will be either Apsines or the author of the treatise, depending on 
ones view of the authorship question; see Heath (n.2), 94f. 
7
 Hermogenes On Issues 48.3-49.6. 
8
 Hermogenes On Issues 46.8-48.7. 
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usage fits our passage admirably. The defendant would not have chosen to bring a 
false charge of adultery against his wife at all; this is the counterposition based on 
motive. And had he been aiming to silence the prisoner, then given that there were 
alternative and less damaging methods, he would not have chosen to do it in this 
way: this is a counterposition based on objection, faulting the prosecutions case 
in respect of the manner of the killing. In this respect, therefore, the transmitted 
text is therefore sound. 
5.20.1-6 (276.3-7): g…netai lÚsij kaˆ metastatikîj À ™pˆ t¦ ™n ¹m‹n p£qh 
suggnwst£, oŒon ¢dike‹j, fhs…n, Øbr…saj: À suggnwstÕj [suggnwstîj 
Volkmann] di¦ mšqhn À di¦ man…an. ™pˆ t¦ ™ktÕj dš, æj ™n tù perˆ 
stef£nou: ¼tthj gšgonaj a‡tioj, ð DhmÒsqenej: kur…a toÚtou ¹ tÚch.  
This is the text in A; B offers only minor variants. The passage has exercised 
editors greatly, but needlessly.  
The heads of argument called transference (met£stasij) and mitigation 
(suggnèmh), together with the homonymous issues, were generally distinguished 
in terms of the external or internal factors that could be cited in defence of an 
admittedly improper action.
9
 So interference by a third party would be an instance 
of transference, overwhelming passion an instance of mitigation. Of the examples 
mentioned in this passage, drunkenness and insanity standardly fall under 
mitigation, and chance under transference.
10
 The distinction between these two 
heads of argument is therefore the key to understanding the passage.  
In the present passage g…netai lÚsij kaˆ... À...  must follow the pattern of 
5.19 (276.1f.), where g…netai dā lÚsij kaˆ ™k toà ™llipoàj À paragrafikîj 
describes alternative kinds of solution,
11
 rather than that of 5.17 (275.4), where ™k 
toà Ðmo…ou and sullogistikîj are equivalent (if there were not an À between 
them, we would not need to introduce one by conjecture). So our author is saying 
that a solution can also arise through transference or mitigation. He could have 
expressed this more symmetrically: g…netai lÚsij kaˆ metastatikîj À 
suggnwmonikîj; the words À ™pˆ t¦ ™n ¹m‹n p£qh suggnwst£ are a 
periphrastic replacement for the latter adverb that anyone familiar with the 
standard definitions of transference and mitigation would understand immediately 
(and that might, conceivably, provide a student who was uncertain on the point 
with a concise reminder of what he had been taught). Likewise the phrase ™pˆ t¦ 
™ktÒj is equivalent to metastatikîj. So we may translate:  
                                                 
9
 Hermogenes articulated the distinction in different terms, while acknowledging the standard 
doctrine: On Issues 39.6-19, 75.11-21. Patillon suggests that in the present passage mitigation has 
been subsumed into transference (148 n.337), but cites no parallel; if there were a difficulty in the 
passage, it would not be acceptable to solve it by postulating a unique occurrence of a non-
standard usage. Dilts and Kennedy, printing metastatikîj but translating metalhptikîj, offer no 
assistance. 
10
 Drunkenness and insanity: RG 4.397.23f., 826.3f.; 5.205.4-6; 7.391.27-29; sch. Dem. 19.101 
(228, p.41.31-32.1). Chance: [Aps.] 5.21.30-32 (277.17-18); RG 7.586.19f.; sch. Dem.. 19.101 
(228, p.42.4-7), 22.17 (53d). 
11
 Patillon rightly reads the following words (À kat¦ crÒnon À kat¦ tÒpon [A: trÒpon B; cf. 
Syr. 2.158.6f.] À kat¦ prÒswpon [om. A]) as subdivisions of paragrafikîj, rather than 
additional alternatives, as do Dilts and Kennedy. 
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Solution can arise also through transference, or with regard to passions internal 
to us that allow of mitigation. E.g.: You have done wrong, he says, in 
committing assaultbut
12
 pardonably, since it was due to drunkenness, or 
madness. And with regard to external factors, as in On the Crown: You are 
responsible for the defeat, Demostheneschance was the mistress of this.  
The sequence of thought, though compressed, is coherent and would be 
readily intelligible to readers trained in the technicalities of issue-theory. The 
transmitted text may stand. 
10.3.9-12 (297.22-298.2): ›teroi dā ½dh metaxÝ tîn prohgoumšnwn [Finckh: 
proeirhmšnwn AB] kaˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn p…stewn ¢nšmnhsan tîn 
prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn kefalaiwdîj mšllontej perˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn 
dialšgesqai.  
Finckhs correction is supported by the parallel in the summary that 
immediately follows, to be discussed below, and by the adaptation at RG 
4.426.20-31 (prohgoumšnwn 426.24).13 The same corruption occurs at another 
point in Gregory of Corinths adaptation of this passage (RG 7.1225.21). Finckh 
also proposed to read proeirhmšnwn in place of prohgoumšnwn; this is possible 
(cf. Anon. Seg. 210f.), is by no means equally compelling. 
The passage in question is the third in a list of four possible positions for 
recapitulation within a speech. But in the following summary it is the second of 
only three positions: (i) at the end of a speech; (ii) metaxÝ... tîn te ¢nagka…wn 
kaˆ tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn; (iii) at the end of an individual head of 
argument (10.3.19-23 (298.9-14)).  
After summarising these three positions, our author goes on to say that a 
recapitulation of type (i) sets out all the questions addressed in the speech, and 
includes a reminder tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn... kaˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn, 
while a recapitulation of type (ii) provides a reminder tîn ¢nagka…wn p…stewn 
(10.3.25-8 (298.14-19)). In place of this last occurrence of ¢nagka…wn Hammer 
conjectured (but did not print) prohgoumšnwn,14 on the grounds that the 
transmitted text seems to contradict the earlier statement that a recapitulation of 
this type provides a reminder tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn when one is going 
on to speak perˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn. The corruption is a relatively old one, since the 
adaptation at RG 4.426.28 already has ¢nagka…wn. But I have been unable to find 
a way to make consistent sense of the paragraph without this change. 
The textual uncertainties are not the only difficulties which this discussion 
presents. The disappearance of the second of the four positions originally listed is 
puzzling. More fundamentally, we need to achieve a clearer understanding of what 
                                                 
12
 On this À see Patillon 54 n.318; I note, however, that at 5.7.7 (271.17) B has À where ¢ll£ is 
undoubtedly correct. 
13
 This comes from a section (422.18-429.5) with the heading (omitted in Walz, but retrieved from 
the manuscript by H. Rabe, Aus Rhetoren Handschriften: 11. Der Dreimänner Kommentar WIV, 
RM 64 (1909), 588) Mhtrof£nouj, 'Aqanas…ou, Porfur…ou kaˆ Polšmwnoj; Metrophanes and 
Porphyry are third-century, Athanasius fourth- or fifth-century, while Polemo is entirely obscure. 
14
 C. Hammer, De Apsine Rhetore (Prog. Guntianum, 1876), 28.  
 5
MALCOLM HEATH, NOTES ON PSEUDO-APSINES 
is meant by leading and necessary proofs or demonstrations,
15
 and of why our 
author assumes that there will be a transitional point between them at which a 
recapitulation can be inserted. 
As often with rhetorical terminology, the usage of prohgoÚmenoj is varied. It 
can refer simply to the order in which points are introduced in a speech; but it can 
also refer to more abstract kinds of precedence which may vary independently of 
the actual order in which things occur in a speech. For example, the leading 
question may be the one which the jury is ultimately required to adjudicate. A 
commentator on Hermogenes observes (RG 7.336.15-337.14) that in incident 
conjectures (such as the case of the general discussed above) the leading question 
is addressed first, and the incident question is introduced subsequently in order to 
test the defences explanation of apparently incriminating facts; by contrast the 
leading question in pre-confirmatory (prokataskeuazÒmenoj) conjecture has to 
be addressed second, since it rests on presuppositions that require prior 
investigation.
16
 From another perspective, however, it is precisely the 
investigation of the presuppositions of the question for ultimate adjudication that 
is leading, since the presuppositions have logical priority. Thus in the First 
Olynthiac the question of whether the war should be fought (advantage) is 
logically prior to the question of how the war is to be financed (feasibility), since 
the latter does not arise unless and until it has been established that the war should 
be fought; but for tactical reasons Demosthenes places what is naturally leading 
(tÍ fÚsei prohgoÚmena) second in order (tÍ t£xei deÚtera: sch. Dem., p.6.32, 
cf. 5.28-30). From yet another perspective arguments which we introduce to 
establish our own case have precedence over those which we use to rebut the 
opposition; hence these too may be called leading arguments. This usage is 
attested, for example, in Sulpicius Victor (324.16-18 Halm): confirmatio est 
eorum argumentorum atque earum quaestionum, quae ex nostra parte sunt, quae 
Graeci prohgoÚmena appellant. Since arguments rebutting the opposition are 
typically presented by way of counterposition and solution, a contrast is often 
made between leading and counterposed heads of arguments (e.g. sch. Dem. 3.10 
(63c); 24.108 (215c),
17
 112 (221)). Of course, tactical considerations can lead to 
complications here too: sometimes a leading head is introduced as if in response 
to a counterposition (æj prÕj ¢nt…qesin: sch. Dem. 17.1 (2, p.197.8-10)). 
Arguments introduced to establish our own case are ones that we use of our 
own choice; in responding to arguments on the other side we are acting under 
constraint or necessity. The point is made by a commentator on Hermogenes (RG 
7.508.21-26): what are leading heads on the prosecutors side are necessarily (™x 
¢n£gkhj) taken up by counterposition on the side of the defenceleading heads 
being those that have a positive probative force (pistwtik£), as distinct from 
those that are solutions to opposing arguments (lutik¦ tîn ™nant…wn). It is in 
this sense that we should understand our authors distinction between leading and 
                                                 
15
 Patillons translation (les preuves directes et nécessaires) is accurate but unenlightening, 
Kennedys (previously introduced demonstrations and full proofs) misleading; Hammers 
reference (n.14) to p…steij œntecnoi is completely misconceived.  
16
 Hermogenes On Issues 57.11-58.2. 
17
 The supplement at 351.17 is wrong: read kat¦ tÕ ˜pÒmenon, as at 352.26. 
 6
MALCOLM HEATH, NOTES ON PSEUDO-APSINES 
necessary proofs. So far as I can determine no extant Greek source provides 
explicit confirmation for this interpretation,
18
 but Fortunatianus does: ipsam 
confirmationem nostrorum argumentorum, quae prohgoÚmena dicuntur, et 
reprehensionem eorum, quae ab adversario proponuntur, quae ¢nagka‹a Graeci 
vocant (108.27-29 Halm); omnis quaestio qualis est? aut prohgoumšnh, quae a 
nobis inducitur, ut confirmetur, aut ¢nagka‹a, quae ab adversariis, ut refellatur 
(117.6f.; cf. 115.1f.).  
Leading and necessary arguments are therefore those used respectively for 
proof and refutation. The existence of a transitional point between the leading and 
necessary arguments at which an interim recapitulation could be inserted follows 
automatically if we assume a theory of the standard structure of a speech in which 
proof and refutation are treated as distinct sections. The Rhetorica ad Herennium 
(1.4) and Cicero (Inv. 1.19) provide evidence for such a theory in Hellenistic 
Greek rhetoric,
19
 and Quintilian explicitly asserts it in the face of those who 
envisage a single section integrating positive and negative arguments (3.9.1, 5). 
But Greek theorists of the second century and later adopt the position which 
Quintilian rejects, distinguishing only four standard parts: proem, narrative, 
arguments and epilogue.
20
 Practice, as reflected in Greek declamation from this 
period, likewise works with a single argumentative section in which positive 
arguments and solutions to opposing arguments are intermingled, generally 
arranging heads of argument in the order set out in the division of the relevant 
issue; the same is true of analyses of Demosthenes speeches in the scholia.
21
 Our 
author does not give an explicit programmatic statement on this point, but seems 
to assume the four-part analysis at 10.2.3-6 (297.2-6).  
It seems likely then, that the doctrine that recapitulation may occur in three 
positions derives from an older source, and has not been perfectly integrated with 
its context. This may also explain the disappearance from the summary of the 
second of the four positions originally listedrecapitulation in the middle of the 
speech (œnioi dā kaˆ kat¦ mšson toà lÒgou ™cr»santo tÍ ¢namn»sei, 
10.3.6f. (297.20)). The use of elements of an epilogue in the middle of a speech is 
                                                 
18
 The distinction is assumed in the essay on memory appended to the fragment of Longinus Art of 
Rhetoric (193 Patillon = 205.11 Spengel-Hammer, with Patillons correction of the transmitted 
text, Ótan dā ¤pthtai tîn p…stewn, <pro>hgoumšnwn te kaˆ ¢nagka…wn di£krisin poioà), 
but no explanation is given. 
19
 Cf. D.H. Isaeus 14: because Isaeus inserts proofs into the narrative, after the narrative he does 
not need to support his leading demonstrations at length, but proceeds directly to the refutation of 
his opponents arguments. This is contrasted with modern technical writers, who by implication 
follow the narrative with leading arguments (i.e. proof) and then a separate refutation. 
20
 E.g. [D.H.] 367.18-21; Anon. Seg. 1. The four-part analysis at Sulpicius Victor 320.14-16 
probably reflects his (second-century) Greek source Zeno (see M. Heath, Zeno the rhetor and the 
thirteen staseis, Eranos 92 (1994), 17-22); Victor himself prefers to distinguish proof and 
refutation (322.4-10, 324.15-20), and it is in this context that he cites the Greek term 
prohgoÚmena.  
21
 For declamation see the comments on illustrative examples in Heath (n.5), and the discussion of 
Lucians Disinherited Son in D.H. Berry and M. Heath, Oratory and declamation, in S. Porter 
(ed.), A Handbook of Classical Rhetoric (Leiden 1997), 393-420. Cases based on the heads of 
purpose (telik¦ kef£laia) are an exception, since there was no default order for these: Heath 
(n.5), 130. 
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an aspect of Demosthenes technique often noted in later Greek sources.
22
 This 
observation has been inserted (either by our author or by some predecessor) into 
material inherited from an older source, thereby creating a doubletfor these 
medial epilogues are generally seen as occurring at the conclusion of individual 
heads of argument: that is, they are identical with type (iii).  
The fact that our author is using material from a variety of sources (as the 
Anonymus Seguerianus does more overtly) may help to explain the variations in 
style and presentational technique that can be observed within the treatise. It is 
also possible that the component parts of the treatise were composed over an 
extended period: the treatise as a whole may have been assembled from what were 
originally short essays on specific aspects of rhetorical technique. I therefore view 
with caution the suggestion, made by both Kennedy and Patillon, that chapter 10 
is the work of a different hand from chapters 1-9. Chapter 10 does indeed have 
distinctive features; but chapters 1-9 are themselves not uniform, the range of 
variation is not obviously greater than might be expected of a single author, and 
chapter 10 seems to resemble the earlier chapters more than it is does the work of 
any other extant rhetorician. Multiple authorship cannot be excluded, but I do not 
think the case has yet been adequately made. 
10.14.6f. (306.11f.): ™k tÁj paraqšsewj ¢mfotšrwn tîn dika…wn sugkr…sewj 
To cure the faulty syntax Patillon supplies À before sugkr…sewj, comparing 
10.8.1f., 12 (302.9f., 20f.): ¢namn»somen dā kaˆ di¦ tÁj sugkr…sewj tîn 
¢mfotšroij dika…wn... À oÛtwj ¢ntiparabaloàmen t¦ ¢ll»lwn d…kaia... But 
that passage offers alternative ways of organising a synkrisis (as Patillon notes, 85 
n.507), not synkrisis and an alternative.
23
 If the problem is to be solved by a 
supplement, therefore, Bakes kaˆ might seem preferable (by juxtaposing the 
claims to justice on each side and comparing them).  
Deletion has also been canvassed as a cure: Dilts and Kennedy bracket 
paraqšsewj, while Hammer bracketed paraqšsewj ¢mfotšrwn tîn dika…wn. 
But the intrusion of paraqšsewj would be difficult to account for, and I suggest 
that a better case could be made for deleting sugkr…sewj. Our author does not 
always phrase a summary in the exact words used in the substantive discussion, as 
the last item in the summary of recapitulations shows (™k tÁj kefalaièdouj 
™kqšsewj tîn e„rhmšnwn: cf. 10.4.1-3, where Patillons text is a distinct 
improvement on that of predecessorsbut the corruption may go still deeper); the 
terminological variation could readily have given rise to an explanatory note that 
was subsequently intruded into the text.   
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 See Anon. Seg. 236; Syrianus 2.111.12-20; Nic. Prog. 40.8-10; sch. Dem. 10.11 (9, p.149.16-
22), 19.72 (172c, p.31.17-23), 24.96 (186b). 
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 The only example I have found of an opposition between sÚgkrisij and par£qesij is at sch. 
Dem. 21.148 (515: oÙ kat¦ sÚgkrisin, ¢ll¦ kat¦ par£qesin). The two terms are far more 
often positively associated with each other; e.g. Aphthonius 31.7f. (sÚgkris…j ™sti lÒgoj 
¢ntexetastikÕj ™k paraqšsewj sun£gwn tù paraballomšnJ tÕ me‹zon; cf. 17.6-10, 22.9f.); 
sch. Dem. 22.1 (1g: kat¦ par£qesin dā proÁktai tÕ proo…mion... sugkr…nei g¦r...); RG 
4.526.14-17, 527.16-20; RG 7.216.9; etc. 
